Foto: Lukoil
The latest round of speculation over Moscow’s designs upon the Czech Republic was sparked by the revelation that the new Party of Citizens’ Rights of Milos Zeman (SPOZ) headed by former Prime Minister Miloš Zeman is being sponsored by Russia’s largest privately owned oil company, Lukoil. The SPOZ admitted that its main sponsors are Martin Nejedlý, the boss of Lukoil Aviation Czech; Miroslav Šlouf, Zeman’s close associate of many years who openly lobbies Lukoil’s interests in the Czech Republic; and Zdeněk Zbytek, a former commander of a tank division under the communist regime, who during the events of November 1989 announced that he was prepared to send his tanks onto the streets to protect the security of the socialist state. Zbytek later became one of the most prominent Czech businessmen in trade with Russia and founded the Klub Rusko, a lobbying group that promotes Russian business interests in the Czech Republic and vice-versa. The SPOZ, however, insists that these three sponsor the party as individuals, and therefore the money does not amount to financial backing from Russia.
The intrigue gained greater depths when it became known that President Václav Klaus met with Zeman at the Prague Castle shortly after the revelation of the SPOZ’s sources of finance. Klaus responded to media speculation that the two probably met to discuss Lukoil interests with a curt written statement. “I received Mr. Zeman to belatedly wish him happy birthday,” he said. Given the previous animosity between the politicians, Klaus’ response with an angry tone did nothing to dispel the speculation. Klaus’s own connections with Lukoil are now well-known. The Russian oil company paid for the publication of his books in Russian and it has emerged that twice in the past 18 months he secretly met with CEO of Lukoil Vagit Alekperov.
The Czech intelligence agency responsible for counter espionage, the Security Information Service (BIS), has repeatedly warned that Russian agents are by far the most active foreign agents in the Czech Republic and that their aim is to support Russian energy interests in Europe and implement Russia’s political interests. “The Russian Federation’s continuing attempts to strengthen its position in European energy by entering several energy companies are influencing the energy security of the Czech Republic,” the agency says in its latest annual report. The report also warns of the return to “Soviet practices” by Russian agents to implement Russia’s foreign-political interests. The report, however, doesn’t substantiate what the Soviet methods now used by Russian agents are, nor does it offer an explanation of what the Kremlin’s foreign political interests are. Unsurprisingly, reports of growing Russian espionage activities that could compromise Czech national security cause concern among the Czech public.
The issue also makes for captivating headlines. “What is more, following the election of the new pro-Russian president of Ukraine, Russian influential pressures are again within reach of the Czech Republic’s borders,” weekly Respekt commented in a recent article dedicated to Czech politicians’ ties with Russian business. Such comments give the cumulative impression that the Kremlin has a political, even military agenda for the region and that it intends to achieve these plans through making the region dependent on Russian energy. In other words, energy is just the thin end of the wedge, and Russia’s goal is to re-establish imperial hegemony in the region. Such suggestions are alarmist and grossly overestimate the grip on power of the current Russian leadership and the strength of the Russian state.
The principal priority of the current Russian leadership is self-preservation: protection of the ruling elites’ business interests and preventing separatist tendencies in the Russian Federation. The priority of Russian foreign policy is to promote the country’s business interests and ensure maximum income from the sale of Russian mineral wealth, weapons, nuclear technology, etc. Declarations about the threat from NATO and re-establishing Russian influence in the so-called “near abroad” and CEE region are designed for domestic consumption. I don’t believe that anyone in the Kremlin entertains daydreams of the Russian Army returning to Czech soil or converting western Slavs to Russian Orthodoxy en-masse. Today’s Russia simply doesn’t have an alternative political-economic ideology that it could attempt to export.
It’s certainly true that over-dependence on Russian energy could present certain dangers in the form of unreasonable price hikes in the event of severe economic troubles within Russia. Therefore, the “energy triangle” endorsed at the recent Central European energy security summit in Budapest must be implemented, but allowing fair access to Russian oil and gas, and nuclear engineering companies should ultimately benefit both industrial and domestic energy consumers in the CEE region. At the same time, the recent speculation about the degree of Russian influence in Czech politics demonstrates the need for clearer laws on lobbying and financing of political parties in the Czech Republic.